Human Events *A Weekly Analysis for the American Citizen*
Editorial Office 1710 Rhode Island Ave., N. W., WASHINGTON 6, D. C. *Telephone* NATIONAL 2066
VOL. VII, No. 38, *Issue Number* 347, SEPTEMBER 20, 1950 ★ *Editor:* FRANK C. HANIGHEN

A GERMAN VIEW OF GERMAN REARMAMENT

by Kurt Hesse
[former Colonel, German Army]

The Korean war has again focused the spotlight of international discussion on the defenses of Europe. The conflict between the Soviet Union or its satellites and the Western world during recent years has cost the United States dearly, not only in material expenditures, but also -- by the dispatch of troops, planes and warships -- in sacrifice of American lives. Consequently, the problem of German rearmament is of some moment to the U.S. at this time, a fact that is fully appreciated in Germany.

A Soviet attack against Europe would probably be directed first at the front presented by Western Germany. Considering the fact that the 50 million people in this area constitute the nucleus of the European bloc, and considering as well the generally acknowledged military qualities of the German people, it would appear natural to incorporate the resources of Western Germany.

However, this is a difficult step not only for the victorious Powers, but also for the government of the West German Republic and the German people. The need for rearmament is not unanimously acknowledged -- it is often violently disputed by Germans. In order to comprehend the gravity of the pending decision, the pertinent psychological, political, economic and military factors must be evaluated.

II

Germany has lost two grim wars, at a heavy cost of life and material goods. Her cities have been extensively destroyed. Millions have been driven from their homes on the other side of the Oder-Neisse line -- territory now annexed by Poland. All this, climaxed by the nightmare of the Russian invasion of 1945, has deeply imprinted itself on the minds of the German people, causing them to reject war much more strongly than is perhaps assumed abroad. This attitude has been intensified by the American re-education program which stressed pacifism, as well as by the reactions of the German public to the convictions of German military leaders and soldiers at Nuremburg.

In addition, the German people have become convinced more and more that the Allies look upon the territory east of the Rhine as nothing

Copyright 1950 by HUMAN EVENTS, INC.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more than an outpost. The inference drawn by Germans in that seven eighths of the German Federated Republic might be considered lost. Who would be willing to fight for such a cause? Another widely held opinion is that rearmament is contemplated only with a view to the security of France, Great Britain and the Benelux countries, with no thought of Germany. In brief, it must be made clear that the occupying Powers who have guaranteed the security of the German people will really keep their word, and will defend Germany east of the Rhine as well, so that the German soldiers will not be just cannon fodder for an alien cause.

This touches on another important psychological problem -- the way in which German soldiers would be used. No German government can send its men into foreign legions; if it does so at all, then only into German units under German command. The latter course would be completely in accord with an incorporation into a European army under a European general staff. It would probably be favorably received if such a fusion were to be under an American chief command.

III

The decision to rearm would in itself constitute a political change. It would assign a new position within the European community of States to the West German Government. This position can be established only if the Bonn Government is on an equal footing with every other Power of a federated Europe with respect to the management of foreign affairs. If, therefore, rearmament is to be a free choice of Germany, the occupying Powers must on their part assume new political positions. They must be friends and helpers, called by the German people themselves.

Other political misgivings spring from the German apprehension that rearmament would call the Russians to the scene, and would further deepen the rift between East and West Germany. No one wants this; everyone is interested in the re-establishment of German unity.

Possible jeopardy of the Schuman Plan is also mentioned. It will be necessary to put it over in Paris, Brussels, Rome and elsewhere, that the economic fusion envisaged in this plan must of necessity be supplemented by a military coalition. The French attitude will require special consideration -- France's fears for her security. Here it can only be again reiterated that the German people entertain feelings neither of hate nor of revenge towards France. On the contrary, the general desire is towards the closest possible union with the French people, with political, economic, cultural and military accord. Today the <u>European concept</u> has replaced the purely German-national attitude.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Not the least of the problems is the financial one. Rearmament costs money. The West German Federation finds itself in an extremely serious financial position. Almost half of its revenues must be paid annually to the occupying Powers. Vital social and cultural obligations to its own people cannot be met under present conditions. Moreover, five years after the war old professional soldiers still do not receive a pension. Altogether, this situation hardly tempts anyone to take up the career of arms. Obviously German rearmament would require active and extensive help from without -- and that means the U.S.A.

IV

Despite the performance of the Soviet Union's military power in World War II, very hazy impressions are still prevalent as to what will be needed to stem a possible onslaught from the East. Real resistance cannot be made with a few poorly armed divisions, nor even less so with partisans or guerrillas. It would be foolhardy not to have modern armor: a modern defense requires more than rifles. It calls for a powerful army, fully equipped with all modern weapons. Competent military authorities mention 30 divisions, at least half of them armored divisions. All units must be fully motorized, with the strongest possible anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons at their disposition.

The Allies, it is reported, desire certain restrictions, on political and psychological grounds. One could conceive of one complete basic issue of equipment only, with all supply depots set up in Great Britain, Southern France or elsewhere, thus precluding the possibility of such material falling into Russian hands. Further one might conceive the continuation of the present prohibition of arms manufacture in Germany; i.e. war material would be supplied primarily by America and Great Britain. It may be said that some German military experts believe such an arrangement necessary because of the danger of Russian occupation.

For practical reasons, it may well be agreed that there be no German airforce of any size, with only such plane groups set up as are needed for purposes of reconnaissance, tactical warfare and communication between the various groups. Aerial battle, as well as protection of the German population by strong air force units would then be the mission of the Allied air forces. The same applies to naval warfare, with only a limited coast guard considered essential on the German part.

If the Allies propose such conditions, difficult problems will arise for the German Government. If, however, good will is shown by both sides, and acceptable proposals are made, there is no reason why these real problems cannot be solved.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Undoubtedly the choice of personnel is especially important in rearmament. There are still plenty of veterans of the last war. But the question today is -- how many of them would be willing to serve? This decision will depend on the political and psychological approach used. Other problems arise with respect to the designation of officers and non-coms, with particular importance attaching to the choice of higher-ranking military leaders. A discussion of the setup of the European Armed Forces might include, perhaps, the establishment of a uniform concept of war.

It is hard to see how the German Government can get popular backing for such a far-reaching decision as is represented by German rearmament, without certain assurances given by the members of the European Union and the Atlantic Pact with respect to the security of Germany. This is just as natural a request as the same request which has been made by the French Government. The German people must know that they are not alone in the arena, not fighting for other Powers only. They must know that it is a question of the united defense of Europe or, rather, of the Western world.

Naturally, the partners to such a pact would have to have the right to fully examine conditions in Germany at any time. The above proposal for German rearmament can be realized only on a basis of complete reciprocal trust and on the conviction that the threat from the East can be averted only by standing shoulder to shoulder.

Beyond question, many obstacles must still be overcome. These include the danger of Soviet intervention, which must be taken into account. The proponents of a neutrality, whether in Germany or elsewhere in Western Europe, based on defenselessness, must be countered; even more so the advocates of the belief that it is useless to defend Europe, because the Russian might makes any defense impossible. No people in history have held their own when they let fatalism take hold. He who will no longer defend home, family and place of work -- either in Germany or elsewhere -- is lost. Even though thought of another war is justifiably rejected by most Germans, the will to live is strong and definite. In the final analysis only a few are ready forever to renounce national existence -- those who do not realize what is at stake.

Colonel Hesse was a career officer under the Kaiser, the Weimar Republic and Hitler. He served as chief press officer in German GHQ, 1939-41. At present he is living in Western Germany, lecturing and writing for the German press.

Quotation up to a paragraph is permitted with credit to HUMAN EVENTS. For reproduction or more extensive quotation address requests to HUMAN EVENTS, 1710 Rhode Island Avenue, N. W., Washington 6, D. C. Trial subscription, three months for $3. Six months, $5.50. One year, $10. Two years, $18. Domestic airmail (including APO and FPO) one year, $12.00; foreign (regular mail) one year, $11. Foreign airmail rates on request. Please remit in U.S.A. DOLLARS. Allow two weeks for new subscriptions or change of address to become effective.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to* Human Events Vol. VII, No. 38

SEP 27 1950

By Frank C. Hanighen September 20, 1950

MARSHALL: It would take a political seismograph of high sensitivity to register all the electric shocks that the appointment of Marshall has caused. Observers instantly assessed the appointment as a triumph for Acheson and the fellow travellers, but a lapse of days has been required to show how deeply and how seriously these shocks have gone. Americans, despite everything, trust their government even while they damn it. What else can they trust? But what few vestiges of faith in the Truman Administration yet remained had all but vanished last week. The balloon raising for a quick peace treaty with Japan, no matter what the Russians say, is interpreted as a determination to get rid of MacArthur at whatever cost. (If the United States is at peace with Japan we do not need a Far East High Command.)

The jamming through of an amendment to the National Security Act to permit Marshall's appointment caused a convulsion. Senator Jenner's speech on September 15 opposing the amendment provided a Senate spectacle of a sort seldom seen. Jenner (Indiana) is an old opponent of the Administration on the Red issue. The amendment released a lot of pent-up feeling from the Hoosier. His speech was like a bellow from a maddened bull. The frustration, the revulsion, the wrath that so many people feel at the limitless capacity of the Administration for welshing and deceit, found expression in this scalding discourse. Discretion was flung to the winds as Jenner screamed out his long list of charges. Despite the luridness of the speech, the core of the Jenner charges -- the faithlessness of the Administration -- is desperately true. It remains to be seen whether the Republicans as a party have the stamina, the resolution, the resiliency to follow through, not only as political astuteness would dictate, but also as common patriotism demands.

* * * * *

THE GOP AND MARSHALL'S PAST: As a matter of fact, the Republicans rallied to the challenge of the Marshall appointment more strongly than observers had expected (when the news first broke). Many GOP members rubbed their eyes on the morrow of the appointment news and realized the situation facing them: (1) that they had made the Far Eastern policy of the Administration the issue of the coming elections; and (2) that Marshall was one of the principal architects of the disastrous Administration policy on China. How could they support the pro-Marshall legislation or vote for his confirmation, when they would have to attack his record on China in the campaign? At the same time, they recognized that Marshall -- thanks to the Fair Deal propaganda machine -- had been made a "sacred cow" in the eyes of the bulk of Americans. No little courage therefore dictated the stand of the score of Republicans in the Senate who voted against the legislation providing for Marshall's appointment.

There were a number of Southern Democrats who were aware of Marshall's unsound record in the Far East. But the curious psychology which moves these Southerners in respect to foreign policy matters apparently forced them into the ranks of the Marshall supporters. Western Republicans watched with disgust as Senator Harry Byrd, who has quite a following in the North, went down the line in a speech on behalf of Marshall. The question was raised among groups in the Republican cloakroom: can one ever trust the Southerners? Certainly Byrd missed a chance to allay the chronic suspicion which Western Republicans feel towards colleagues from the South. How can the entente cordiale of Southern Democrats and Republicans make any progress (and Southern Senators profess to want such progress) with such spectacles as that put on by Byrd?

Copyright 1950 by Human Events, Inc.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The case of Senator Pat McCarran, Democrat of Nevada, stood in striking contrast to that of Byrd. McCarran, now up for re-election, showed great courage in lining up with the Republicans against the pro-Marshall legislation. For he faces pressure at home, induced by "New York money" which has poured into Nevada. And he undoubtedly felt "cloakroom pressure" as well.

It is now reported that Senator Jenner encountered some of the latter himself. Jenner's mimeographed speech was circulated in the press gallery some time before he delivered it on the floor and a copy apparently got into the hands of a certain Southern Senator who approached Jenner with the question, "You really don't consider delivering such a speech?" Jenner replied in the affirmative. "Well, then", remarked the Southerner, "we'll break you." Jenner retorted, "The people of Indiana won't break me." Meanwhile, Senator Lehmann of New York is reported to have read the advance copy of the speech and to have rushed to Senator Saltonstall (R. Mass.). He is said to have urged Saltonstall to reply to Jenner.

All sorts of excerpts from the hardly brilliant record of Marshall in China have been going around. It is recalled that in 1947, in his farewell statement before returning to the U.S., Marshall described as "reactionary" those Chinese who objected to bringing the Communists into a coalition government; that he prated of "agrarian reformers", etc. (the line of the pro-Communists in the State Department). Not only did he fail to clean out Communists from the State Department, but it was when he was Chief of Staff that Communists were allowed to be commissioned officers in the Army, and that an attempt was made by officers in the War Department to destroy files on subversives. But it is his China policy which will principally plague him. It is reported that the opposition has Marshall worried. A friend of Marshall's tells us that the General is concerned about his place in history. Will historians look at the Marshall policy on China as does Congressman Judd, who said: "It always was fantastic to imagine that we could convert our enemies into our friends, by treating our friends as if they were our enemies."

* * * * *

LOWENTHAL: You may be hearing the name of Mr. Max Lowenthal rather frequently from now on. In this column of September 25, 1946, we noted that he was serving in Germany as an adviser to General Clay. Then silence in the press about Mr. Lowenthal until recently. Not long ago Congressman Dondero named Mr. Lowenthal as an undercover worker for the Leftist brethren, who reached "pinnacles of great power in Washington". And last Friday, September 15, the House Un-American Activities Committee queried Mr. Lowenthal in executive session. Lowenthal became acquainted with the then Senator Truman at the time of the Senate investigation of railroads just before World War II. After Truman became President, there were reports that Mr. Lowenthal was a frequent visitor to the White House. Following the hearings before the Committee last week, the Washington Times-Herald reported that Lowenthal admitted acquaintanceship with Alger and Donald Hiss, Lee Pressman and others named as members of the famous Communist cell in Washington by Whittaker Chambers; and that he had been a member of the National Lawyers Guild, designated a Communist front by the House Committee. "Questioning of Lowenthal", says the Times-Herald, "was reported to have been cautious because of his powerful connections."

Whether cautious or not, and whether founded or unfounded the basis for the questioning, it is decidedly news when an Administration-dominated Committee -- the House Un-American Activities Committee -- is constrained to interrogate one of the intimate friends and advisers of the President of the United States. It is reliably reported that a New Deal figure in a forthcoming book will describe at some length the close relations of Mr. Lowenthal and Mr. Truman. One current rumor is that Lowenthal helped draft the Administration-backed measure -- the Kilgore bill -- for

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

taking care of subversives. Miss Lonigan last week described the reasons why this bill was thrown into the Congressional hopper in an attempt to prevent passage of the vastly more important and potentially more effective provisions of the legislation backed by Senators McCarran, Mundt and Congressman Nixon.

* * * * *

FIFTH COLUMN IN RADIO: Edna Lonigan comments -- The story of Communist influence in radio erupted recently when the advertising agency cancelled a performance of "The Aldrich Family" because of popular protests against the hiring of Jean Muir, who had helped support nine Communist fronts. Communist influence is greater in radio than even its great -- and growing -- influence in the movies. It is indeed a scandal that American corporations paid large amounts of their advertising funds to known Communist and fellow traveller writers, performers and composers, depriving anti-Communist American artists of an equal number of openings to earn their living and use their talents.

In radio as elsewhere the Communists work as a military unit, constantly pushing each other up the ladder and knocking anti-Communists off. Business corporations submitted to this blackmail partly because Communists readily recognize anti-Communists, and it was a difficult and costly job for private citizens to check the record of thousands of artists against numerous official records. There seemed no way to meet this situation until the magazine Counterattack published in a pamphlet entitled "Red Channels" the names of artists and writers in radio, with the fronts they had sponsored and the official citations.

The furious outcry from the Communist side was evidence that they were hurt. Their arguments were spread over the country and picked up as usual by the innocents. The New York Times said, "Trial by character assassination must stop." But, as Counterattack says, why didn't the newspapers show any interest in finding out why Lois Wilson, an anti-Communist, was dropped from "The Aldrich Family" last season? How can any radio actor or writer join a dozen Communist fronts and not know he is supporting the Communist Party? As a rule, he joins to get preferred employment, or to get off the Communist blacklist. He pays for his "protection" by contributions to the front organizations or by hiring other fellow travellers and refusing employment to anti-Communists. It is time we recognized this injured innocence stance for what it is, a good act, directed by top Communists to protect their most effective people. As Congressman Nixon said of Hiss, when the other members of the House Un-American Activities Committee wavered, "innocent men do not have such neat answers all ready". The shouting and the tumult about "Red Channels" is the best possible proof that the technique of the Mundt-Nixon-McCarran bill is a mortal blow to the use of fronts.

* * * * *

EWING: One of the few pieces of comic relief about the capital during the past few weeks was furnished by that renowned political spotlight chaser, Oscar Ewing. Ewing had slipped on so many Washington banana peels; he had fallen on his face so often, that he turned to the New York situation as a richer field. He began to pant for the Democratic nomination for the New York Governorship. The CIO was willing to back him, but not Boss Flynn; and so Ewing had to give way to an unknown Bronx Congressman, Lynch.

Ewing's publicity machine at the Federal Security Agency is famous. Not a day passes without the issue of a release on some subject. There is a proverb: Ewing not only marks every sparrow's fall but issues a release to commemorate it. Hence, during the days before the New York convention when Ewing still thought there was a ray of hope, there was a loud laugh for a minute when one of the Agency's releases startd off: "Greater protection to cheese consumers will result from the new cheese standards promulgated today, Federal Security Administrator Oscar R. Ewing declared."

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Events

The Road to Pearl Harbor, by Herbert Feis. Princeton: Princeton University Press. $5.00. Reviewed by Walter Trohan.

Revisionism takes a seven-league stride forward in this story of the coming of the war -- on December 7, 1941, between the United States and Japan -- by Dr. Feis, State Department adviser on international economic affairs. The sustained effort to heap the full weight of the disaster on the shoulders of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Major General Walter C. Short is abandoned except for a passing and undefended statement that they had received an adequate warning.

Feis makes no effort to switch blame to Washington, except for a somewhat vague reference to General Marshall's fumbling with the final alert which arrived after the attack, and an even more vague mention that Secretary of State Cordell Hull dissuaded President Roosevelt from informing Congress of the state of negotiations. Nor does the author foster the myth that FDR was endowed with greater vision than his fellow countrymen and led them on to horizons only he could see. And there is no minimization of the fact that "Magic", the name for the cracking of the Japanese code, made it apparent to the high-level directors of foreign policy in Washington that Japan was moving to war.

The latest line on Pearl Harbor, as offered by Feis, is that Japanese peace efforts were insincere and that the final American terms did not constitute an ultimatum "in the political or the military sense". Administration apologists have now swung around an arc of admissions and are seeking to lead thinking back to where it was on the day of the attack. The true culprit, so runs the new line, is Jap treachery and the facts of the attack and failure to warn the defenders are mere incidents in the inevitability of war.

To support this line the Roosevelt forces yield almost everything to critics save the charge that FDR maneuvered the Jap crisis in order to get into the war on the side of the Allies in the face of overwhelming popular sentiment for peace. Feis discloses that FDR told Chinese Ambassador Hu Shih, some fifteen minutes before the first bombs fell in Hawaii, that he expected "foul play" and that he had a feeling something "nasty" might happen in Thailand, the Dutch East Indies and possibly on American soil -- the Philippines. At the same time Marshall and his staff, Feis says, "fumbled with and over a last minute alert to the commanders at the outposts".

"And in the event that Japan struck at the Philippines, Guam or Hawaii, he [FDR] would not have to argue with those who still believed that the United States should take no part in foreign wars", Feis writes, indicating the President had a reason for some welcome of attack. The war is still a holy cause, but the FDR myth emerges a bit less glorious.

Feis does say that days before Pearl Harbor "signs that the end was close became as plain as if written on a blackboard for children". And he does acknowledge that at dinner on December 6, 1941, FDR said in effect, "This means war", as he read the final Jap message. Feis almost admits that FDR expected war at the Philippines, possibly, but not at Pearl Harbor.

In his Foreword, Feis tells us that he was helped by many colleagues and "all had an eager interest in having the whole story known, told and understood". And he names, among others, former Secretary of War Stimson, former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, former Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of State Acheson, former Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter and Eelco N. van Kleffens, former Foreign Minister of the Netherlands government in exile.

In fact almost the only thing missing to support the newest revision of Pearl Harbor is a message from the grave.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

European Supplement *to* Human Events Vol. VII, No. 38

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND RECEIVED SEP 19 LIBRARY

By Bertrand de Jouvenel PARIS -- September, 1950

EUROPEAN ADMIRATION AND AFFECTION FOR THE G.I. IN KOREA: The conduct of American troops in Korea causes profound admiration over here. Life in wartime for the infantryman consists, as most of us know, of short periods of extreme strain, separated by long periods of outdoor camping or marching, healthy and soothing to the nerves. What makes the toughness of a war is the duration and frequency of the strain periods. And it seems to the reader of dispatches that the American troops have been submitted to a continuous strain ever since their landing, which makes the campaign a formidable exploit on the part of the men, especially those of the 24th Division. That these should still be in line is something which even the most hard-boiled veterans among us regard as a phenomenal military feat.

The impression made upon European opinion is a most useful one. American armies have twice intervened decisively in European wars, not without inspiring some jealousy of their achievements. Hence you hear it stressed that the Americans came as fresh troops in a late stage of the war, dealing with battered enemies, and endowed with wonderful war instruments. Some would say: "Brave young men, yes, but how would they have stood up under the gruelling of Verdun or Stalingrad?" In nations which think of the soldier as essentially an infantryman, the Korean campaign has lifted the reputation of the American soldier onto a pedestal of glory.

* * *

WHY IT FALLS TO AMERICANS: Whatever the moral value of American sacrifices in Korea, it surely would have been better to achieve the same political results without expenditure of American blood.

Let us go back to the beginning of the century. Then as now, Russia was rapidly extending her influence in Asia. To British annoyance she tended to vassalize Persia, Tibet and Afghanistan; to American annoyance she precluded a subservient Chinese government from keeping to Hay's principle of the "open door". Already in possession of Manchuria, she claimed a huge concession in Korea. This expansion was rolled back by the Japanese in the 1904-05 war.

Let us stress that American soldiers are dying in Korea for want of any Asiatic Power -- such as Japan was -- capable of arresting Russian expansion.

Turning now to Europe we find a clamor for substantial American forces to be quartered in Germany. A garrison of American divisions for Central Europe in peacetime is an amazing paradox. I can well understand the reluctance of American opinion: and yet the thing is needed. Why? Because in Europe as well as in Asia the natural rampart against Russian expansion has been thoroughly destroyed.

During the last five centuries, Russia has ceaselessly expanded. At the beginning of this century, she was met almost everywhere by solid military Powers. Japan checked her in the East, Germany and Austria-Hungary in the West. To the South, Britain attended to Turkey and Persia and the London cabinet was able to arouse Russia's neighbors as in the Berlin Congress of 1878.

The First World War destroyed Austria-Hungary. World War II destroyed the military power of Germany and Japan. Thus the three sentries which stood watch over Russia were all knocked out.

Is it then to be wondered at that Russia now sprawls over areas of Asia from which she was formerly kept out by Japan, lords it over the Balkans where her influence used to be matched by that of Austria-Hungary, holds sway in the greater part of what used to be Austria-Hungary (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Transylvania) and has even caught in her grip a part of prostrate Germany?

Copyright 1950 by Human Events, Inc.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What we are witnessing is far less the spread of world revolution than simply a formidable progress of Russia's secular expansion, facilitated by the complete wrecking of all the Powers that formerly checked it.

* * *

THE ENEMY -- RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM, NOT COMMUNISM: It is, I feel, a misrepresentation, and a dangerous one, to regard the expansion which threatens us as that of Communism. This is not true: not the doctrine of Lenin but the Russian armies have conquered Eastern Europe. Neither in the Balt States, nor in Poland, nor in Romania, in Bulgaria, in Hungary, had the Communists the least chance of gaining power by any legal process. Only Russian victory made the Communist Party the chief one in Czechoslovakia and power was seized by force before the people had the chance of reconsidering the verdict expressed in the excitement of a liberation which we left to the Russian armies. Even in China, the victory of Mao is not that of Communism: a peasant revolt against the abuses of town merchants was aided by Russia, and a few graduates of the Leninist school of Leningrad provide its intellectual spearhead.

It is dangerous to concentrate on the Communist aspect of Russian expansion, because this misleads us into thinking that proper internal policies are the answer: repressive policies on the one hand against the Communist leaders, bold social policies on the other hand to remove grievances. Let us remember that this combination of repression (that is, decline of individual guarantees) and social progress (under the form of collective organization) constitutes the essence of Fascism. Fascism is precisely the gearing of a State to an internal Communist menace.

The real issue is quite different. What we have to guard against is purely and simply Russian imperialism, using social agitation as one of its tools, local nationalism being another (Communism is nationalist in Eastern Germany, and demands the "liberation" of Western Germany; it is nationalist in France, and demands that Germany be kept down).

* * *

FAILURE OF STATESMEN: Many do not like to admit that this is no fundamentally novel situation because the formidable position which Russian imperialism has been allowed to attain testifies to the utter lack of statesmanship in the West over the last period of years.

When, with the mind's eye, an American looks across the ocean, whether it is the one or the other, he sees the same huge mass of land, either from its European or from its Asiatic side. Asia-with-Europe, in every sense a single continent, stands seven times as large as the United States. This enormous area is overshadowed by a single mighty Power: Russia. There is no other Power to be seen on the whole surface at all capable of holding its ground against a Russian advance. This clearing of the board to leave Russia standing alone has been the work of the two World Wars but mainly of the second. In the second, Western policy blindly worked for Russia. Everything Russia's power politics demanded, the Western leaders freely offered: indeed, from memoirs which have since come to light, it seems that they were in a perpetual tantrum lest Russia should after all not want to destroy her natural enemies; the geographic checks to her expansion. Historians will wonder at such inexplicable conduct.

Having cleared the board all around Russia, the United States (or the English-speaking Powers) had the choice of letting the Russian flood fill the bed prepared for it, or of building up dikes. After the Chiang dike had been left to fall there was nothing anywhere. That is why the Americans are fighting in Korea today; will be called to do so tomorrow in Indo-China; sometime or other in Persia; and why they are called into Europe to fill the void of German power.

* * *

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMERICA'S MILITARY PROBLEM IN EUROPE: The alternative is obvious: it is to build up Powers capable of holding their own against Russia and to call in the Americans only to tip the scales.

If such a line of conduct is to be followed, then the United States' military policy should be influenced by it. It should aim not at building up an irresistible force in a distant future, but at setting up immediately a considerable force capable of holding the lines until other Powers have been set up: and when they are, American forces might be allowed to dwindle.

One cannot help feeling that the way the United States is attacking the problem of rearmament is the way which was suitable in the completely different circumstances obtaining at the outset of the two last wars. Then the United States stood far behind Powers which seemed capable of dealing with the enemy.

But, in the present case, there being no other forces either in Europe or Asia than those of Russia, it falls upon American forces to prevent total seizure of Asia and Europe at the outset. And this task lies on American shoulders during the whole period, let us call it the interim period, before Powers capable of self-defense are set up in Asia and Europe. This being the case, building up the American army of 18 divisions by next June seems, to us on this side, painfully inadequate.

What should rationally have been done (but this, of course, was then psychologically impossible) was the building up of Western European forces while a huge American army was in Europe after its 1945 victory.

Building up power in Europe means either building up individual Powers, or building up an integrated Western European Power. The middle course which has been adopted, of helping all willing States -- such as they are -- and hoping that the combination of their forces will work, is tainted, one fears, with some wishful thinking. Surely an army is at its best when it reflects a political unity and is animated by a single purpose. A defeat suffered in the German plains by the army of the Brussels Powers (Britain, France, Belgium and Holland) would, one fears, send the various component parts back to cover their own frontiers or shores. One cannot help feeling that the generous assistance dealt out by the U.S. to European Powers puts Washington in a position to demand that the military functions of the several States should be devolved to a single Defense Directorate, with its own finances and its own powers; the beginning of European government.

* * *

GERMAN REARMAMENT: Failing such a course and if defense is to be left in the hands of the several governments, nothing is clearer than that the government of Western Germany must be one of them, on a par with its associates. The stupidity of keeping Germany disarmed can be brought out by a geographical comparison. Let us say that the Atlantic states of the U.S. are threatened by a powerful enemy which holds the Mississippi line and is on the eastern border of Illinois. In the meantime the rulers of the several threatened states insist that Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and most of Pennsylvania should be left disarmed, with some garrisons which, say, France would be called upon to provide from overseas. Is it sensible?

Few enough in Europe regard it as sensible. But many know that should they speak their minds on the subject, they would draw upon themselves the full fire of the Communists who would represent them as traitors and Fascists.

The rearmament of Germany is a Soviet privilege on which no trespass is allowed. There is ample reason to think that the Soviets propose to build up a Red German Army which will "liberate" Western Germany and police Continental Western Europe for them. The French are not far off when they fear another German occupation, rather than a Russian. It may be a German occupation for Soviet account.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Events

Truman, Stalin and Peace, by Albert Z. Carr. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company. $2.75. Reviewed by Edna Lonigan.

This is an excellent example of the new style in government propaganda. An official of the middle ranks, after travelling all over Europe and Asia at the citizens' expense, comes home, resigns, and writes a book in which he says, "See: I know all the answers, I was there." He tells what MacArthur and Chiang and Truman said to him, and then proposes a plan for bringing true "democracy" to the world, which plan turns out exactly to parallel Truman's Fair Deal.

Carr was with Donald Nelson. He tells on page one how Nelson (when his power was beginning to wane) went into deep thought and came up with the idea that we ought to make a large loan to Russia which would not only help her repair her devastated areas, but also would use up our "surpluses" so as to avoid a depression. What Mr. Carr does not know is that Earl Browder and other agents of the Politburo had come over here with the same idea some time before, and had disseminated it to the best of their ability. Mr. Nelson had picked the notion out of the air, because it had been carefully fed into the prevailing air currents by Soviet rumor brigades.

Evidence of Mr. Carr's political perspicacity is displayed again on the second page. He says that in 1943 "Stalin had shown his interest in having Western good will by dissolving the Communist International". He then goes on for 265 pages blaming the present impasse on isolationist Senators, reactionary Congressmen, greedy American businessmen, Right Wing army officers, German cartels, and the "feudalism" of Chiang Kai-shek. But he never mentions the existence of a Soviet fifth column on our soil. No Hiss or Marzani ever worked for the State Department, and the loyalty program is merely a "smear attack upon a number of patriotic and useful Americans", especially, he says, "in the field of science".

Mr. Carr does know however what the more naive Fair Dealers have been taught to believe: President Truman will bring peace to the world. Peace depends on American success in winning over the masses in Europe and Asia, who yearn for a "rising standard of living". The workers see this rising standard in terms of "low-cost housing, universal medical care, higher real wages, better working conditions, more food and clothing for their families". Presumably we are to supply them. The same program at home serves peace because it will prevent depression, which would drag every nation down, and bring world chaos and ultimate Communist triumph. This is a fighting faith, even if it rests on economic and political nonsense.

Mr. Carr is a true child of present-day education. He says "American democracy succeeds because . . . it gives most Americans a chance to work steadily at fairly paid jobs". This is Alice-in-Wonderland history. American democracy arises out of three centuries of experience during the better part of which almost no one worked for wages. He does not know he is talking about Continental democracy. He does not know that Communist propaganda turns largely on subtle replacement of Continental for American "democracy". Continental "democracy" rests not on individualism but on the hope that the "good" State will take care of the masses. It is beautifully adapted to the Communist strategy for winning the masses by promising all things to all men, while its agents insinuate themselves into the key positions in government.

Carr quotes a story from General MacArthur about the latter's conversation with a man named Malik who, a few years ago, was Russian ambassador to Japan. According to the General, Malik said that, of course, the Russians had not given up the Comintern. They were planning on its winning for them, "even if it took a hundred years". It will, with help from the Carrs.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED